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I. INTRODUCTION 
Austin and Max Leclaire are fifteen year-old brothers from Pembroke, 
Massachusetts.1 Both Austin and Max suffer from Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy, a degenerative and fatal disease of the muscles.2 But over the past 
144 weeks, the physical conditions of the brothers have progressed in opposite 
directions. Max has shown extreme progress—for example, he no longer 
requires a wheelchair and can now run and ride a bike—while Austin has 
declined, no longer able to walk, brush his teeth, or hold a water bottle.3 This 
drastic divergence in health outcomes stems from the brothers’ unequal access 
to experimental drugs.  
Max has been a participant in a promising new clinical trial where he has 
been given weekly infusions of the experimental drug known as Eteplirsen, 
which is manufactured by Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. and intended to transform 
the disease into a milder form of muscular dystrophy that, while still chronic, 
is no longer fatal.4 Austin, however, was unable to participate in the trial due 
to his more advanced condition of the disease.5 It took over three years before 
the FDA created a clinical trial that Austin qualified to participate in, and 
during this waiting period he lost many crucial motor skills, such as the ability 
to transfer himself from his wheelchair to his bed.6 And for those individuals 
who never qualify for a clinical trial, their best hope is that the drug Eteplirsen 
will gain market approval by the FDA sooner rather than later.7 Unfortunately, 
this process may take anywhere from two to ten years.8  
                                                                                                                     
 1 Michael Ollove, Right-to-Try for the Terminally Ill, USA TODAY (June 19, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/19/stateline-fda-terminal-illness-drugs/ 
10836705/ [https://perma.cc/FQ7V-7LD6]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Darcy Olsen, Dying Patients Should Have ‘Right to Try’ New Treatments, TIME 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://time.com/4091290/right-to-try/ [https://perma.cc/AY76-ZU82]. 
 5 Ollove, supra note 1. Refusal of access to clinical trials, as in Austin’s case, is not 
uncommon for the terminally ill, as there are several barriers they may face to 
participation. Most notably, as a way to minimize the number of variables in the study, 
drug sponsors control the trials by requiring that applicants meet very specific eligibility 
criteria, and individuals with more complex illnesses or conditions that differ even slightly 
from the criteria being studied will be excluded. Rebecca Dresser, The “Right to Try” 
Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631, 
1635 (2015). 
 6 Olsen, supra note 4. 
 7 Ollove, supra note 1. 
 8 While several sources maintain that the drug approval process takes upwards of a 
decade, see, e.g., Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 
Billion, TUFTS CTR. FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/ 
news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study [https://perma.cc/L4FH-E6YF], the 
FDA maintains that priority applications are approved within three years of submission and 
standard applications within five. FDA, FY 2010 PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 
(PDUFA) PERFORMANCE REPORT 4 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ 
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Law professor Michael Malinowski tells a different story regarding access 
to investigational drugs.9 His father, Joe, who had been diagnosed with a form 
of terminal cancer, sought and was able to secure experimental treatments.10 
Initially, the drugs were successful and expanded Joe’s productive lifespan by 
fourteen years.11 Encouraged by the positive results, when his condition began 
to deteriorate again many years later, Joe pursued more experimental 
treatments.12 This time, however, the drugs sent Joe’s health into a serious 
decline, and he suffered devastating side effects before passing away.13  
The heartbreaking stories of the Leclaire brothers and Joe Malinowski 
illustrate both sides of an emotionally charged debate amongst legal, ethical, 
and medical scholars alike. As a response to stories like the Leclaire brothers’ 
and with hopes of providing increased access to experimental drugs for 
terminally ill individuals, many states have passed Right to Try laws at a rapid 
pace within the last two years.14 These laws grant patients with terminal 
illnesses access to drugs and treatments that have passed preliminary safety 
testing, but have not yet been approved by the FDA.15 By eliminating the FDA 
from the drug approval process, the purpose of these laws is to pave an 
expedited path to access to promising experimental treatments by cutting the 
                                                                                                                     
ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/PDUFA/UCM24335
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ25-J8X6].  
 9 Michael J. Malinowski, Throwing Dirt on Doctor Frankenstein’s Grave: Access to 
Experimental Treatments at the End of Life, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 615, 616–19 (2014). 
 10 Id. at 616. 
 11 Id. at 617. 
 12 Id. at 618. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Terminal Patients’ Right to Try Act, 2014 Ariz. Legis. Serv. H. Con. Res. 
2005 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1311 to -1314 (West Supp. 2015)); Right to 
Try Act, 2014 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 220 (H.B. 14-1281) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 25-45-101 to -108 (2015)); see also infra Part III. 
 15 Kimberly Leonard, Seeking the Right to Try, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 18, 
2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/18/right-to-try-laws-allowing-patients-
to-try-experimental-drugs-bypass-fda [https://perma.cc/7ANU-6L5A]; see also The Editorial 
Bd., Quicker Access to Experimental Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/opinion/quicker-access-to-experimental-drugs.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B32S-57LR] (noting that although these investigational drugs have passed initial 
safety testing, they are “still years away from reaching pharmacy shelves”). Only a certain 
“eligible patient” may take advantage of these laws, defined generally, with slight 
variations among the state laws, as someone who has an advanced or terminal illness, has 
considered all other FDA-approved treatment options, has given written, informed consent, 
and has physician endorsement. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-103(1)(a); Right to 
Try Model Legislation § 1(2)(b) (Goldwater Inst. 2016), https://goldwater-media.s3. 
amazonaws.com/cms_page_media/2016/1/5/GoldwaterInstituteRighttoTryModel.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/EK2Y-FDMC]. An “advanced illness” or “terminal illness” is defined by statute 
as “a disease that, without life-sustaining procedures, will soon result in death or a state of 
permanent unconsciousness from which recovery is unlikely.” COLO. REV. STAT.§ 25-45-
103(3); see also Right to Try Model Legislation, supra, § 1(2)(a) (proposing a similar 
definition). 
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bureaucratic red tape that is manifested in the form of unnecessary paperwork 
and wait times.16 However, as stories such as Joe Malinowski’s illustrate, the 
hope of prolonging the life of the terminally ill often overshadows the dangers 
that could arise from increased access. 
The current FDA approval process requires manufacturing companies 
seeking to introduce drugs to the market to conduct animal testing and three 
phases of human clinical trials prior to submitting a New Drug Application 
(NDA) to the FDA for review.17 The NDA requires that a manufacturer 
present evidence at that time of submission of a drug’s safety and efficacy.18 
Because this process can be cumbersome, the FDA offers expanded access 
options through its compassionate use program.19 Individuals may qualify for 
compassionate use and obtain access to promising experimental drugs if they 
have either a “serious disease/condition” or an illness that is “immediately life 
threatening.”20 A treating physician must act as an individual’s sponsor and, in 
addition to completing an application estimated by the FDA to take upwards of 
100 hours, obtain drug company consent and IRB approval.21 
Critics of the FDA’s processes believe that individuals with serious or 
terminal illnesses do not have the luxury of waiting for either premarket 
approval or the granting of a compassionate use exception; therefore, in 
response to this concern, state legislatures have stepped in and attempted to 
remove barriers to access. Within the past two years alone, almost half of all 
states have passed Right to Try laws.22 Given the upsurge in this recent 
legislation and the sensitive subject matter of the laws, the policy debate 
regarding Right to Try laws has been heated, yet the legality of these statutes 
has not yet been seriously questioned.  
However, it is probable that Right to Try laws violate the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution by encroaching on congressionally 
                                                                                                                     
 16 Christina Corieri, The Right to Try, GOLDWATER INST. (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/healthcare/right-to-try/right-try/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DYF9-TFUE]. 
 17 Ollove, supra note 1.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Expanded Access: Information for Patients, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ucm20041768.htm [https://perma.cc/P8AW-P5SE] 
(last updated Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Information for Patients]; see also 21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.300 (2015). 
 20 Information for Patients, supra note 19 (defining both terms). Furthermore, there 
are several other qualifying criteria that must be met for individuals to qualify for 
compassionate use. For example, the FDA must determine that “[t]here is no comparable or 
satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or treat the disease or condition.” Id.; 
see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(a); Expanded Access and Expedited Approval of New 
Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Illness/HIVAIDS/ 
Treatment/ucm134331.htm [https://perma.cc/NJ7E-2DKY] (last updated Aug. 7, 2014) 
[hereinafter New HIV/AIDS Therapies].  
 21 Leonard, supra note 15; see also Information for Patients, supra note 19. 
 22 See infra note 115. 
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mandated FDA authority to regulate the premarket drug approval process and 
ensure the safety and effectiveness of drugs on the market.23 While the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)24 does not contain an express preemption 
clause, it does state that federal rule governs if there is a “direct and positive 
conflict” with a state law.25 A “direct conflict” exists between the FDCA and 
state Right to Try laws because it is impossible for organizations to comply 
with both laws, and the purpose of the FDA to regulate new drugs is 
undoubtedly frustrated.26 Thus, a court would likely find that Right to Try 
laws are impliedly preempted.  
In addition to questions surrounding the legality of Right to Try laws, 
there are also several policy implications to consider. Advocates of the laws 
contend that terminally ill individuals are in unique circumstances and should 
be exempt from unnecessary government interference, which is preventing 
them from obtaining potentially life-saving treatment.27 They argue that 
physician support coupled with Phase I safety and toxicity testing provide 
adequate safeguards, beyond which individuals are capable of making their 
own treatment decisions, particularly when it is a question of life or death.28  
On the other hand, opponents of Right to Try legislation not only believe 
that the laws will result in negative policy outcomes, but also question their 
effectiveness. Many drug companies are concerned that providing Right to Try 
patients with access to experimental drugs will jeopardize ultimate FDA 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See infra Part IV. 
 24 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 25 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (quoting Drug Amendments of 1962, 
Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (“Nothing in the amendments made by the 
Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any 
provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless 
there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of State 
law.” (emphasis added))). 
 26 See, e.g., FDCA § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (“No person shall introduce or 
deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an 
application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to 
such drug.”). If drug companies are able to provide drugs directly to patients without FDA 
involvement, the administration will no longer be able to monitor the effects of these 
investigational new drugs.  
 27 See infra Part V.A. For example, physicians will arguably benefit the most from 
Right to Try laws because, under the legislation, they are no longer required to spend 100 
hours filling out FDA-required paperwork in order to be granted a compassionate use 
exception by the FDA. Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, ‘Right to Try’ Laws Spur 
Debate over Dying Patients’ Access to Experimental Drugs, WASH. POST (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/right-to-try-laws-spur-debate-over-
dying-patients-access-to-experimental-drugs/2014/05/16/820e08c8-dcfa-11e3-b745-87d39 
690c5c0_story.html [https://perma.cc/NS8L-445Z]. 
 28 Dresser, supra note 5, at 1632. 
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approval.29 In addition, providing limited amounts of experimental drugs is 
costly, and the risk of potential liability is high.30 If drug companies are 
unwilling to provide experimental drugs directly to patients as Right to Try 
laws allow, terminally ill patients will not receive treatments any faster than 
they would proceeding under the FDA’s compassionate use program, as the 
state laws do not coerce drug manufacturers into participation.31 Without 
incentives for drug manufacturers to provide experimental treatments, the 
value of Right to Try laws may be severely limited.  
This Note proposes a threefold solution for the future of Right to Try laws. 
First, the FDA should promulgate a regulation or guidance clearly articulating 
the viewpoint that these state laws are unconstitutional. Next, if such laws 
remain on the books, a party with standing to sue, such as a drug company, 
should file a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment on the legality of Right to 
Try laws. Finally, the FDA must work with state and federal legislators to 
undertake a series of reform measures that will result in a more streamlined 
compassionate use program, while at the same time fulfilling its mission that 
drugs remain safe and effective. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II provides background information 
on the history of the FDA, the drug approval process, and compassionate use. 
It then examines the derivation of Right to Try laws, dating back to a 2006 
D.C. Circuit decision in Abigail Alliance.32 Part III provides a more detailed 
overview of Right to Try legislation, and Part IV discusses the law of 
preemption and its application to Right to Try laws. Part V addresses policy 
concerns surrounding the state laws before Part VI offers a view of the future 
of Right to Try legislation. 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Jason Millman, Voters in Arizona Just Overwhelmingly Backed a ‘Dallas Buyers 
Club’ Law. Will It Help Patients?, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/05/voters-in-arizona-just-overwhelmingly-backed-a-
dallas-buyers-club-law-will-it-help-patients/ [https://perma.cc/3G3E-76QT]. The FDA may 
view drug companies that provide access via Right to Try laws as circumventing federal 
authority; alternatively, if negative outcomes arise from providing the drugs early, it is 
likely the drugs will never gain full market approval.  
 30 See Leonard, supra note 15. 
 31 Whether one proceeds through the FDA-sponsored compassionate use program or 
Right to Try laws, approval of a drug company must be obtained in both instances. David 
Gorski, The False Hope of “Right-to-Try” Metastasizes to Michigan, SCI.-BASED MED. 
(July 21, 2014), http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/the-false-hope-of-right-to-try-
metastasizes-to-michigan/ [https://perma.cc/3HTY-KWBL]. 
 32 Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach 
(Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
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II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION 
A. The Role of the FDA 
The Food & Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency tasked with 
protecting the public against unsafe and mislabeled products.33 This authority 
includes reviewing applications submitted by drug companies to sell drugs to 
the general public and deciding whether such drugs are safe, effective, and 
should be available for public treatment and consumption.34 The FDA derives 
its authority from a series of federal statutes, including the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938 and the 1962 amendments to that Act, known 
as the Kefauver Harris Amendments.35  
1. Background 
Historically, matters of health and safety were thought by many to be 
matters best fit for state regulation.36 Although this was the initial viewpoint of 
the FDA as well, beginning in the early 1900s, Congress enacted a series of 
statutes and amendments that vastly enlarged the scope of federal power in this 
area. In 1906, Congress passed its first public health law, the Federal Food and 
Drugs Act, which prohibited the manufacture or shipment in interstate 
commerce of adulterated or misbranded drugs and served as a statutory 
supplement to state common-law liability.37  
By 1938, however, concerns over unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing 
remained; therefore, Congress passed the FDCA to bolster consumer 
protection against harmful products.38 The FDCA’s most significant 
contribution was the wide, sweeping authority it granted to the FDA to govern 
the premarket approval process of drugs. It required every drug manufacturer 
to submit an NDA to the FDA for review prior to selling drugs in the market.39 
Under the Act, the manufacturers were prohibited from distributing new drugs 
                                                                                                                     
 33 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 24 (3d ed. 2007). 
 34 Leonard, supra note 15. 
 35 See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
 36 Hillsborough Cty. V. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) 
(stating that the “regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a 
matter of local concern”); Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) 
(“States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as ‘to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’” (quoting 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872))). 
 37 Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 566 (2009). 
 38 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 566.  
 39 FDCA § 505(a)–(b), 52 Stat. at 1052; Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 566. 
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until either the FDA affirmatively approved the application or sixty days 
passed after the application was filed.40  
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments enlarged the FDA’s powers to 
“protect the public health” and “assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability 
of drugs” even further.41 They did so by shifting the burden from the FDA to 
prove that a drug was unsafe, to the manufacturer, who was now required to 
affirmatively demonstrate that a drug was safe for consumption and effective 
before it could be marketed.42 Despite the appearance of a vast grant of federal 
power to the FDA, Congress also included within the amendments a clause 
limiting the scope of federal preemption of state law.43 This savings clause 
provided that a provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a “direct 
and positive conflict” with the FDCA.44  
In 1976, Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments (MDA),45 
which created a comprehensive and multi-tiered scheme of federal regulation 
of the premarket approval of medical devices, which severely curbed states’ 
authority over the subject.46 This Act also included an express preemption 
                                                                                                                     
 40 FDCA § 505(c), 52 Stat. at 1052; Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 566. 
 41 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, pmbl., 76 Stat. 780, 780. The 
Drug Amendments of 1962 were commonly called the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, 
named after the two congressional sponsors: Sen. Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) and Rep. Oren 
Harris (D-Ark.). Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FDA 
CONSUMER HEALTH INFO., Oct. 2012, at 1, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/UCM322886.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDQ7-UKFT]. 
 42 Id. §§ 102(c), 104(b), 76 Stat. at 781, 784; Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (“[T]he [1962] 
amendments required the manufacturer to demonstrate that its drug was ‘safe for use under 
the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling’ before it 
could distribute the drug.”). The Kefauver-Harris Amendments largely originated due to 
public outrage over the discovery in the 1960s that a sedative prescribed to pregnant 
women to alleviate morning sickness was causing birth defects. See Leonard, supra note 
15; see also Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note 
41, at 1. 
 43 Drug Amendments of 1962 § 202, 76 Stat. at 793 (“Nothing in the amendments 
made by this Act to the [FDCA] shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State 
law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and 
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of State law.”). 
 44 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (quoting Drug Amendments of 1962 § 202, 76 Stat. at 793). 
 45 Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c–360k, 379, 379a; 42 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012)). 
 46 MDA § 2, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e, 360i (2012); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 
316–18 (2008) (describing the premarket approval application to require full reports of all 
studies and investigations into the safety and effectiveness of the drug at issue; a “full 
statement” of the device’s “components, ingredients, and properties and of the principle or 
principles of operation”; “a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and 
controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation 
of, such device” (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1))); Premarket Approval (PMA), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Medicaldevices/Deviceregulationandguidance/Howtomarketyourdevice/ 
Premarketsubmissions/Premarketapprovalpma/Default.Htm [https://perma.cc/J8S3-U3HF] 
(last updated Aug. 19, 2014). 
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provision.47 And most recently, in 2012 Congress passed the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA),48 which “expands the 
FDA’s authorities and strengthens the Agency’s ability to safeguard and 
advance public health.”49 FDASIA gives the FDA the authority to collect user 
fees to provide it with the funding necessary to complete both comprehensive 
and timely review of new products; provides for a new expedited drug 
development tool known as breakthrough therapy; and presents stakeholders 
with increased ways to offer input into FDA decision making.50 
2. Drug Approval Process 
Pursuant to the FDCA, in order for drug companies to sell their drugs on 
the open market, they must first gain FDA approval.51 Initially, when a drug 
sponsor identifies a potential new drug, it will conduct preclinical animal 
testing to determine whether the molecule exhibits pharmacological activity 
and assess its acute toxicity potential, ultimately making an initial 
determination as to whether the product is safe for initial use in humans.52 
Having decided a product is a viable candidate for human testing, the drug 
sponsor will then submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the 
FDA, which includes the results of animal studies, manufacturing information, 
including the composition of the drug, and detailed protocols for proposed 
human testing, or clinical trials.53 The purpose of the IND application is 
                                                                                                                     
 47 See MDA § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—(1) which is different from, 
or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which 
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.”). 
 48 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Improvement Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. 
No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 49 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/ 
FDASIA/ucm20027187.htm [https://perma.cc/MT82-FVQS] (last updated Oct. 6, 2015). 
 50 Id.; see also FDASIA §§ 101–408, 902, 905, 126 Stat. at 996–1039, 1086–88, 
1092. 
 51 FDCA § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for 
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application 
filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such 
drug.”); see also Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ [https://perma.cc/S3GA-R6LV] (last updated Jan. 
29, 2016). 
 52 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplication
s/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm [https://perma.cc/X29W-5AV8] 
(last updated Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter IND Application]. 
 53 Id. 
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twofold. First, because most sponsors will conduct clinical trials in multiple 
states, the IND serves as an exemption to the statutory requirement that a drug 
must be FDA-approved prior to being transported across state lines.54 
Additionally, it allows the FDA time to complete its own preliminary review 
to ensure that the proposed clinical trials do not place the human subjects at an 
unreasonable risk of harm.55 An institutional review board (IRB) also reviews 
the IND.56 A drug sponsor must wait thirty days after the submission of the 
IND before it is permitted to begin clinical testing.57 
Clinical testing comprises three phases of human trials designed to test 
whether a drug is safe and effective for general public consumption.58 After 
successful completion of all three phases of clinical trials—a process which 
can take several years59—only then can a drug company submit a New Drug 
Application (NDA), a formal request to the FDA seeking approval of the drug 
to be marketed in the United States. After an NDA is received, the FDA has 
sixty days to determine whether to file the application for comprehensive 
review.60 All in all, the entire drug approval process can take over a decade to 
complete and cost pharmaceutical companies approximately $1.2 billion per 
drug.61  
                                                                                                                     
 54 Id.; see also FDCA § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
 55 IND Application, supra note 52. 
 56 The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
RUZ2-K5FG] (last updated Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Drug Review Process]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally FDCA § 505(b), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). Phase I studies typically consist 
of twenty to eighty healthy individuals, and the goal of this initial phase is to determine 
whether a drug is safe, its most frequent side effects, and how it is metabolized and 
excreted. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2015); Drug Review Process, supra note 56. If the results 
of Phase I studies do not reveal excessive toxicity, Phase II studies begin. Approximately 
seventy percent of drugs successfully pass Phase I. Dresser, supra note 5, at 1634. While 
the emphasis in Phase I is safety, Phase II addresses a drug’s efficacy. At this stage, there 
are typically between a few dozen and 300 participants who all have a common disease—
some are given the experimental drug and other patients receive a placebo. Drug Review 
Process, supra note 56. The purpose of Phase II studies is to “evaluate the effectiveness of 
the [Phase I investigational new] drug . . . and to determine the common short-term side 
effects and risks associated with the drug.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). Only about one third of 
proposed drugs are successful at both Phases I and II. Dresser, supra note 5, at 1635. 
Finally, if a drug shows promise of effectiveness at Phase II, Phase III testing expands the 
testing pool to between several hundred and 3,000 subjects and focuses on both safety and 
efficacy, administering the drug to different populations, in different dosages, and in 
combination with other drugs. Drug Approval Process Infographic, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/UCM284393.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89SU-D4DJ]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).  
 59 The Drug Development Process: Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm [https://perma.cc/29TT-
XWHT] (last updated Nov. 23, 2015). 
 60 Drug Approval Process Infographic, supra note 58. 
 61 Leonard, supra note 15. 
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Given the time and cost associated with the FDA approval process, the 
FDCA also provides options for manufacturers to apply for expedited approval 
of a drug if certain additional criteria are met.62 For example, a drug can 
receive a “Fast Track” designation if it will be used to treat a serious condition 
and has the potential to address an unmet medical need.63 Such a classification 
may make a manufacturer eligible for “rolling review,” whereby the Agency 
agrees to review portions of the NDA prior to the sponsor submitting a 
completed application.64 If a drug is approved via this process, the Agency 
may require the sponsor to conduct post-approval studies.65 In addition, the 
Accelerated Approval program provides another expedited route to drug 
approval through the utilization of surrogate endpoints.66 Rather than waiting 
an extended time to determine whether a drug provides an intended clinical 
benefit, the FDA can base its approval of drugs on the use of surrogate 
endpoints, which are markers—such as a laboratory measure or an X-ray—
that predict a likely clinical benefit.67 For example, many cancer drugs 
proceed via the Accelerated Approval program. Rather than waiting to see 
whether a cancer drug will in fact extend human life, the FDA may approve a 
drug based on evidence that it shrinks a tumor, as such evidence serves as a 
surrogate endpoint and is considered predictive of extending life expectancy.68 
3. Expanded Access: Compassionate Use 
In addition to the Fast Track and Accelerated Approval programs designed 
to expedite approval of NDAs, the FDA also provides avenues for individuals 
to gain access to drugs that have not yet been approved via either the 
traditional or expedited processes. Under its compassionate use program, the 
FDA allows drug companies to manufacture and distribute individual dosages 
of unapproved, investigational drugs to certain qualifying individuals.69 The 
aim of this program is to “facilitate the availability of [investigational] drugs to 
patients with serious diseases or conditions when there is no comparable or 
satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or treat the patient’s 
disease or condition.”70  
                                                                                                                     
 62 21 C.F.R. § 312.80; see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED 
PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS—DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 1 (May 2014) [hereinafter 
FDA GUIDANCE: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidance 
complianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm358301.pdf [https://perma.cc/63HX-X2S3].  
 63 FDCA § 506, 21 U.S.C. § 356; see also FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 62, at 9. 
 64 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 62, at 10. 
 65 FDCA § 506, 21 U.S.C. § 356. 
 66 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. 
 67 Drug Approval Process Infographic, supra note 58. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See generally Information for Patients, supra note 19.  
 70 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(a); New HIV/AIDS Therapies, supra note 20. “Serious disease 
or condition” is defined in the regulation as “a disease or condition associated with 
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In order for an individual to qualify for compassionate use, a sponsor must 
submit an IND application or protocol amendment to an existing IND on her 
behalf.71 This application is typically submitted by an individual’s physician 
and is estimated to take approximately 100 hours to complete.72 Moreover, a 
physician must also make an independent determination that the “probable risk 
to the person from the investigational drug is not greater than the probable risk 
from the disease or condition,” and the FDA must be satisfied that “the patient 
cannot obtain the drug under another IND or protocol.”73 Finally, prior to 
completing the application, the patient and physician must have first obtained 
consent from a drug manufacturer willing to provide the experimental drug. 
If a new IND is submitted, the FDA has thirty days to consider it before 
either granting or denying access.74 If a new protocol is submitted as an 
amendment to an existing IND, there is no thirty-day wait period; however, the 
protocol must be received by the FDA and approved by an IRB before 
treatment may begin.75 If access is granted, the regulations stipulate 
monitoring and reporting requirements for the treating physician, including the 
submission of reports relating to safety and adverse events.76  
                                                                                                                     
morbidity that has [a] substantial impact on day-to-day functioning.” 21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.300(b). 
 71 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(b).  
 72 Id. Some of the requirements of the application are listed below: 
(ii) The rationale for the intended use of the drug, including [all] of [the] available 
therapeutic options that would ordinarily be tried before resorting to the 
investigational [new] drug or an explanation of why the use of the investigational 
[new] drug is preferable to the use of available therapeutic options; 
(iii) . . . [A] description of the patient’s disease or condition, including recent medical 
history and previous treatments of the disease or condition; 
(iv) The method of administration of the drug, dose, and duration of therapy; 
(v) A description of the facility where the drug will be manufactured; 
(vi) Chemistry, manufacturing, and controls information . . . ; 
(vii) Pharmacology and toxicology information . . . ; 
(viii) A description of clinical procedures, laboratory tests, or other monitoring 
necessary to evaluate the effects of the drug and minimize its risks.  
Id. 
 73 Id. § 312.310(a)(1)–(2). 
 74 Id. § 312.305(d). 
 75 Expanded Access Categories for Drugs (Including Biologics), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/u
cm431774.htm [https://perma.cc/UXH7-QD6H] (last updated Feb. 4, 2015). 
 76 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(c). The FDA also offers “emergency expanded access” if an 
emergency requires that a patient be treated before the written application can be 
completed. Under this exception, the treating physician can request access by making a 
phone call to the FDA and explaining how the expanded access, if granted, will meet all 
regulatory requirements of sections 312.305 and 312.310. A written application must then 
be submitted within fifteen working days. Id. § 312.310(d). 
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B. Obstacles to Access for Terminally Ill Individuals Under the FDA 
System 
Thus, under current FDA protocol, an individual with a terminal illness 
seeking to gain access to unapproved treatment, has three options: (1) Wait 
until the drug is granted FDA-approval via the traditional or Fast Track 
processes; (2) Apply to be a participant in a clinical trial currently underway 
by drug manufacturers working towards FDA approval; or (3) Apply to the 
FDA’s compassionate use program.  
 Because drug approval can take upwards of a decade, and time is not a 
luxury terminally ill patients enjoy, the first option is not a viable one. 
Applying and being accepted into a clinical trial is ideal, as a patient gains 
immediate access to treatment and is closely monitored by scientists and 
physicians. However, the terminally ill oftentimes fail to meet specific 
eligibility requirements for clinical trials as their conditions may be too 
complex and advanced. Such complexity makes it difficult for scientists to 
control for certain variables and isolate the single condition that the drug is 
supposed to treat, ultimately hindering their ability to properly assess a drug’s 
safety and effectiveness.77 Furthermore, some patients may live too far away 
from clinical trials to participate, or their age or exposure to previous 
treatments may make them ineligible; still others may not even apply for such 
trials due to an unwillingness to accept frequent testing demands or out of fear 
of being given a placebo.78  
Because many individuals will be turned away from clinical trials, 
expanded access is often their final hope. Unfortunately, while the FDA’s 
compassionate use program allows terminally ill patients the opportunity to 
gain access to a drug without having to wait years until it is approved, this 
expedited process may still take a significant amount of time to complete. 
Physicians seeking experimental treatment on behalf of a terminally ill 
individual must first obtain manufacturer consent and IRB approval, and 
complete dense and complex paperwork before the FDA will review the 
case.79 And even then, in certain instances after submission of the application, 
the FDA has at least thirty days to make a determination as to whether or not 
to grant access.80  
While the FDA has purportedly approved ninety-nine percent of 
compassionate use requests between 2010 and 2014, critics complain that this 
approval rate only accounts for a fraction of the total patients who might 
possibly benefit from experimental treatments, excluding those who either 
didn’t know about expanded access or who had a doctor with insufficient time 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Leonard, supra note 15. 
 78 Dresser, supra note 5, at 1635–36. 
 79 See supra Part II.A.3; see also Leonard, supra note 15. 
 80 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(d). 
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to complete the paperwork.81 Because many believed the FDA treatment 
options for terminally ill individuals were inadequate, advocates of increased 
access turned first to the court system for redress, before lobbying state 
legislatures in what ultimately would lead to the passage of the first Right to 
Try laws. 
C. Abigail Alliance and the Origin of Right to Try Laws 
The foundation of the Right to Try laws can be traced back to Abigail 
Burroughs and a series of Abigail Alliance court decisions.82 Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Alliance) is a public interest 
organization comprised of terminally ill patients and supporters seeking access 
to experimental drugs for the terminally ill.83 The organization was founded by 
Frank Burroughs, whose daughter Abigail had been diagnosed with head and 
neck cancer when she was a student at the University of Virginia.84 Abigail 
attempted to gain access to multiple experimental drugs that were undergoing 
clinical trials at the time, but failed to qualify for any of the studies.85 
Moreover, Abigail tried and failed to obtain access to treatment through the 
FDA’s expanded access program because she was unable to obtain consent 
from a manufacturer to provide the drugs.86  
After Abigail’s death in 2001, her father, Frank, founded the Alliance, 
which filed a citizen petition with the FDA.87 This petition emphasized that 
there is a “different risk-benefit tradeoff facing patients who are terminally ill 
and who have no other treatment options,” and urged that terminally ill 
patients should be given the opportunity to try new treatments that have met a 
lower evidentiary burden in regards to their safety and efficacy.88  
                                                                                                                     
 81 Lisa Rapaport, U.S. ‘Right to Try’ Laws May Not Help Dying Get Unapproved 
Drugs, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-dying-
experimental-drugs-idUSKCN0RS2LN20150928 [https://perma.cc/G5UH-GF6X]; see also 
The Editorial Bd., FDA vs. Right to Try: Our View, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/17/ebola-drugs-terminally-ill-right-to-try-
editorials-debates/14206039/ [https://perma.cc/GCL2-GMQE] (recognizing that the 
process to obtain experimental treatment is so daunting that fewer than 1,000 people sought 
and received federal approval in 2014). 
 82 Jann Bellamy, The Illusions of “Right to Try” Laws, SCI.-BASED MED.  
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/the-illusions-of-right-to-try-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NLN-HD8U]. 
 83 Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach 
(Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), rev’g 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
 84 See Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: The Reality Behind the Right to Get 
Experimental Drugs, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (2008). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 699 (quoting Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance & the 
Washington Legal Foundation to the Food & Drug Administration at 9, In re Tier 1 Initial 
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The FDA did not respond to this petition, and the Alliance resorted to 
filing a claim in federal court, appending a constitutional argument as well.89 
The Alliance argued that the Constitution provided a right of access to 
experimental drugs for the terminally ill, and that the FDA’s lengthy approval 
process, combined with numerous restrictions on preapproval availability, 
denied them this right and “amount[ed] to a death sentence for these 
[terminally ill] patients.”90 The Alliance contended that this right of access 
should include allowing sponsors to market experimental drugs after the 
completion of Phase I trials.91  
A panel of three on the D.C. Circuit found the Alliance’s claim to have 
merit and recognized the existence of a constitutional right of access; however, 
this decision was reversed en banc.92 The en banc court held that terminally ill 
patients do not have a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause 
to access investigational drugs.93 The court reached this conclusion after 
determining that our nation has a history of federal drug regulation, 
emphasizing both the scope and purpose of the FDCA and the 1962 
amendments thereto, which granted full authority to the FDA to condition a 
drug’s market approval on meeting safety and efficacy requirements.94 
Further, the court emphasized that although a drug may pass Phase I trials, this 
                                                                                                                     
Approval Program to Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs (June 11, 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03p0274/03p-0274-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8ZLB-7B5F]).  
 89 Id. at 700. Although the FDA did not respond to this particular petition, it had 
responded to earlier petitions by the Alliance, where it noted that the issues raised pointed 
to “an area of significant range of opinion within the patient and provider communities 
about the standards that should be met before a drug is marketed.” Id. (quoting Letter from 
Peter J. Pitts, Assoc. Comm’r for External Relations, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Frank Burroughs, President, Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 4 
(Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter DHHS Letter]). The FDA also commented on the inevitable 
tension between early availability of these products and the need to obtain sufficient data as 
to their safety and efficacy. Ultimately, the Agency concluded that accepting Alliance’s 
proposal “would upset the appropriate balance that [it is] seeking to maintain, by giving 
almost total weight to the goal of early availability and giving little recognition to the 
importance of marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge for patients and physicians of 
their likely clinical benefit and their toxicity.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DHHS 
Letter, supra, at 5). 
 90 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Complaint ¶ 14, Abigail All. for Better 
Access to Development Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 30, 2004)). 
 91 Id. at 701.  
 92 Id. at 697. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 705–06 (“The fact that a drug has emerged from Phase I 
with a determination that it is safe for limited clinical testing in a controlled and closely-
monitored environment after detailed scrutiny of each trial participant does not mean that a 
drug is safe for use beyond supervised trials. FDA regulation of post-Phase I drugs is 
entirely consistent with our historical tradition of prohibiting the sale of unsafe drugs.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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does not amount to a determination that a drug is safe for general 
consumption: “current law bans access to an experimental drug on safety 
grounds until it has successfully completed all phases of testing.”95  
Interestingly, the opinion concluded by urging the Alliance to seek an 
alternative forum for its claims—the legislature.96 The Alliance heeded the 
court’s advice, taking its arguments to state legislators who proved to be more 
receptive to its cause. Although a constitutional right would have recognized 
increased access nationwide, Right to Try laws ultimately seek to achieve the 
primary end goal of the Alliance—expanded access for terminally ill patients 
to experimental drugs—albeit one state at a time. 
III. RIGHT TO TRY LEGISLATION 
Within the past two years, Right to Try laws have emerged as an alluring 
alternative for terminally ill patients to the long and administratively arduous 
FDA drug approval process.97 The main purpose of these state-based laws is to 
increase access to promising new drugs, allowing, as their name suggests, 
individuals with terminal illnesses the “right to try” experimental treatments 
that could potentially save their lives. State lawmakers seek to accomplish 
their goal of increased access by circumventing the protracted FDA approval 
process, thereby reducing paperwork, wait times, and overall federal 
administrative bureaucracy.98 In states that have passed Right to Try laws, 
                                                                                                                     
 95 Id. at 703; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2015). 
 96 Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 713 (“The Alliance’s arguments about morality, quality of 
life, and acceptable levels of medical risk are certainly ones that can be aired in the 
democratic branches, without injecting the courts into unknown questions of science and 
medicine. Our Nation’s history and traditions have consistently demonstrated that the 
democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain 
risks and benefits of medical technology, and are entitled to deference in doing 
so. . . . Consistent with [Supreme Court] precedent, our holding today ensures that this 
debate among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and the 
public may continue through the democratic process.”).  
 97 These laws were originally dubbed “Dallas Buyers Club” bills, a reference to the 
recent, award-winning movie that chronicled the story of an AIDS patient’s efforts to 
smuggle unapproved drugs from Mexico into Texas, in a desperate attempt to treat 
symptoms of the disease, while portraying the FDA as an indifferent and unresponsive 
bureaucracy. Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. Activists of the AIDS epidemic were largely 
responsible for the creation of the FDA’s first broad expanded access program, which 
made it easier for AIDS patients to obtain investigational drugs outside of clinical trials, 
which were difficult to qualify for. Dresser, supra note 5, at 1636. The association of Right 
to Try laws with this pop-culture film has been used as a springboard for legislators 
attempting to implement health policy and has been effective in capturing widespread 
public support. 
 98 CHRISTINA CORIERI, GOLDWATER INST., POLICY REPORT NO. 266: EVERYONE 
DESERVES THE RIGHT TO TRY: EMPOWERING THE TERMINALLY ILL TO TAKE CONTROL  
OF THEIR TREATMENT 1 (Feb. 2014), https://goldwater-media.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
cms_page_media/2015/1/28/Right%20To%20Try.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7YS-T8PT].  
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terminally ill patients are no longer required to wait for drugs to complete the 
FDA approval process—a delay many cannot afford—nor must their 
physicians navigate the bureaucratic thickets of the FDA’s compassionate use 
program in order to gain access to encouraging new treatment options.99 The 
laws thereby eliminate the 100-hour FDA compassionate use application 
process, and doctors, on behalf of their patients, may work directly with drug 
manufacturers to discuss the benefits and risks of experimental treatment 
options and reach a final determination without involving the FDA.100  
The Goldwater Institute and the Alliance have been the leading advocates 
of Right to Try legislation and largely responsible for jumpstarting the 
conversation for expanded access for terminally ill individuals at the state 
level.101 Believing that the FDA should not inhibit individuals from exercising 
a basic freedom of preserving one’s own life, the Goldwater Institute 
encouraged states to pass legislation offering individuals a way to obtain 
investigational drugs that have passed certain basic safety testing, provided 
that a physician has recommended the treatment, the patient has provided 
informed consent, and the drug manufacturer has signaled a willingness to 
provide the drugs.102 The Goldwater Institute also provided template 
legislation for Right to Try laws,103 which has been adopted by some states in 
its entirety.104 Several key provisions of this model act are set forth below: 
 To gain access to treatment, an individual must be an Eligible Patient, 
defined as someone with an Advanced Illness who has considered all 
other FDA-approved treatment options, received recommendation 
from her physician, given informed consent, and secured 
documentation from her physician that she meets the criteria of an 
Eligible Patient;105 
 Advanced Illness is defined as “a progressive disease or medical or 
surgical condition that entails significant functional impairment, that is 
not considered by a treating physician to be reversible even with 
administration of current federal drug administration approved and 
available treatments, and that, without life-sustaining procedures, will 
soon result in death;”106 
 Investigational Drugs eligible to be provided via Right to Try 
legislation are those drugs that have “successfully completed [a] 
                                                                                                                     
 99 Leonard, supra note 15.  
 100 Id.; Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. 
 101 Leonard, supra note 15 (according to Darcy Olsen, President of the Goldwater 
Institute: “Terminal patients shouldn’t have to ask the government for permission to try to 
save their own lives.”); see also infra Part V.A. 
 102 CORIERI, supra note 98, at 1.  
 103 Right to Try Model Legislation, supra note 15.  
 104 See, e.g., Right to Try Act, 2014 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 345 (S.B. 991) (codified at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26451–.26457 (West Supp. 2015)). 
 105 Right to Try Model Legislation, supra note 15, § 1(2)(b). 
 106 Id. § 1(2)(a). 
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Phase 1 . . . clinical trial” and, while not yet approved for general use 
by the FDA, continue to undergo further FDA-approved clinical trial 
testing;107  
 Neither insurance providers nor drug manufacturers are obligated to 
pay for the care and treatment costs that result from the use of the 
investigational drug or treatment, and consequently, the Eligible 
Patient may be liable for all expenses related to the experimental 
treatment;108 and 
 Doctors, hospitals, and manufacturers that do not follow the FDA 
approval process are protected from disciplinary actions taken by a 
licensing board or disciplinary subcommittee.109  
The first wave of Right to Try legislation took hold in 2014 when five 
states enacted such laws—Colorado,110 Louisiana,111 Missouri,112 
Michigan,113 and Arizona.114 These laws continued to gain momentum at a 
dramatic pace in 2015, as now over twenty states have passed some version of 
                                                                                                                     
 107 Id. § 1(2)(c). 
 108 Id. §§ 1–3. 
 109 Id. §§ 1–3, 5; see also Leonard, supra note 15. It is important to note, however, that 
these laws may only protect such parties from prosecution at the state level. The FDA still 
holds federal jurisdiction and therefore these parties will likely not be protected from all 
liability. Furthermore, regardless of the overall legality of these laws, the ability of a state 
to prevent liability from befalling a party when there is diversity jurisdiction (e.g., when a 
doctor requests medication from a drug maker in another state) seems unlikely. 
 110 Right To Try Act, 2014 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 220 (H.B. 14-1281) (codified at 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-45-101 to -108 (2015)). The first amongst Right to Try laws, this 
bill was passed unanimously by the Colorado legislature in May 2014. While the law does 
not explicitly follow the Goldwater legislation, it does draw heavily from its text. 
Representative Joann Ginal, a co-sponsor of the bill, was inspired after an experimental 
treatment helped her older brother who had been diagnosed with a rare blood cancer. 
Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. 
 111 Right to Try Act, 2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 346 (H.B. 891) (codified at LA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1169.1–.6 (Supp. 2016)). Passed on the heels of Colorado’s law, the 
Louisiana act closely parallels its sister state and also contains a section of legislative 
findings. 
 112 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1685 (codified at MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.480 (West 
Supp. 2015)). In July 2014, Missouri became the third state to pass a Right to Try law. 
State Representative Jim Neely, a physician, was the sponsor of the bill. His daughter has 
been battling colon cancer and has been disqualified from participating in clinical trials to 
receive access to investigational treatment. Mike Sherry, Missouri Becomes Third State to 
Enact ‘Right to Try’ Drug Therapy Law, KCPT (July 15, 2014), http://www.kcpt.org/ 
health/missouri-state-enact-right-try-drug-therapy-law [https://perma.cc/FD5W-FWUE]. 
 113 Right to Try Act, 2014 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 345 (S.B. 991) (codified at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26451–.26457 (West Supp. 2015)). Passed in October 2014, this 
law is identical to the Goldwater Institute model legislation. 
 114 Terminal Patients’ Right to Try Act, 2014 Ariz. Legis. Serv. H. Con. Res. 2005 
(codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1311 to -1314 (West Supp. 2015)). Arizona 
became the first state to pass a Right to Try law by ballot initiative in November 2014. 
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Right to Try legislation.115 This phenomenon will likely continue as many 
more states have bills currently pending.116 The majority of Right to Try laws 
that have been enacted have garnered bipartisan support and have passed 
unanimously in state legislatures across the country.117 In October 2015, 
however, Governor Jerry Brown became the first governor to veto a Right to 
Try bill, despite the fact that it passed the California State Assembly by a 
unanimous vote.118 The Governor cited recent FDA reform measures that 
attempt to streamline the compassionate use program as the reason for the 
                                                                                                                     
 115 Gabe Griffin Right to Try Act, 2015 Ala. Laws Act 2015-320 (S.B. 357) (codified 
at ALA. CODE §§ 22-5D-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2015)); Terminal Patients’ Right to Try Act, 
2014 Ariz. Legis. Serv. H. Con. Res. 2005 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1311 
to -1314 (West Supp. 2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Ark. Laws Act 374 (S.B. 4) (codified 
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-15-2101 to -2111 (Supp. 2015)); Right To Try Act, 2014 Colo. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 220 (H.B. 14-1281) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-45-101 to -108 
(2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2015-107 (H.B. 269) (codified at 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295 (West Supp. 2016)); 2015 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 2-2015 
(H.E.A. 1065) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-42-26-1 to -5 (West Supp. 2015)); Right 
to Try Act, 2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 346 (H.B. 891) (codified at LA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 40:1169.1–.6 (Supp. 2016)); Right To Try Act, 2014 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 345 (S.B. 
991) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26451–.26457 (West Supp. 2015)); 
Right to Try Act, 2015 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 15 (S.F. 100) (codified at MINN. STAT. 
§ 151.375 (2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Miss. Laws Ch. 423 (S.B. 2485) (codified at 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-131-1 (West Supp. 2015)); 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1685 
(codified at MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.480 (West Supp. 2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Mont. 
Laws Ch. 135 (S.B. 142) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-12-101 to -110 (2015)); 
2015 Nev. Laws Ch. 210 (A.B. 164, 2015 Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015)); Right to Try 
Act, 2015 N.C. Laws S.L. 2015-137 (H.B. 652) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-325 to 
-325.7 (2015)); 2015 N.D. Laws Ch. 199 (S.B. 2259) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-
48-01 to -05 (Supp. 2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 112 (H.B. 
1074) (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3091.1–.7 (West Supp. 2016)); 2015 S.D. 
Laws Ch. 188 (H.B. 1080) (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-51-1 to -10 (Supp. 
2015)); Phil Timp-Amanda Wilcox Right to Try Act, 2015 Tenn. Laws Pub. Ch. 376 (H.B. 
143) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-301 to -310 (Supp. 2015)); Right to Try Act, 
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 502 (H.B. 21) (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§§ 489.001–.151 (West Supp. 2015)); Utah Right to Try Act, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 110 
(H.B. 94) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-85-101 to -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015)); 
2015 Va. Laws Ch. 655 (S.B. 732), Ch. 656 (H.B. 1750) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 54.1-3442.1 to -3442.4 (Supp. 2015)); Right to Try Act, 2015 Wyo. Laws Ch. 174 (S.F. 
3) (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-7-1801 to -1806 (2015)). 
 116 See, e.g., An Act Providing a Right to Try, H.B. 3270, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2015) (referred to Joint Committee on Public Health); Right to Try Act, S.B. 0029, 
99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015) (final action deadline extended to April 2016). 
 117 Michael Barone, The Success of Right to Try Laws Signals a Major Policy Shift, 
N.Y. POST (Oct. 6, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/10/06/the-success-of-right-to-try-laws-
signals-a-major-policy-shift/ [https://perma.cc/4MLG-4Z6B]. 
 118 Laura Mahoney, California Governor Vetoes Right-to-Try Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.bna.com/california-governor-vetoes-n57982059470/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X238-RW5C].  
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veto.119 It is possible that the state legislature will override Governor Brown’s 
veto in 2016, and it remains to be seen whether other states with pending 
legislation will follow the Governor’s lead in taking a “wait and see” approach 
that would allow time for the FDA to implement new reforms.120 
IV. THE LEGAL DEBATE: ARE RIGHT TO TRY LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Right to Try laws are unconstitutional because they are preempted by 
federal FDA authority. The FDCA creates a comprehensive statutory scheme 
of federal regulation in the approval, administration, labeling, and reporting 
requirements of drugs shipped in interstate commerce, and vests the FDA with 
exclusive authority to promulgate regulations in the area; consequently, state 
laws infringing on that exclusivity are null.121 Right to Try legislation itself 
explicitly recognizes the supremacy of federal law, noting that drugs 
administered via the state laws must not only pass Phase I clinical trials but 
also must still be involved in the clinical trial process.122 Once the FDA 
approval process commences, the manufacturer is by definition under FDA 
jurisdiction and thus bound to follow federal law.123 However, because Right 
to Try laws directly conflict with the FDCA, it is impossible for a drug 
manufacturer to comply with both; thus, the law of preemption dictates that 
state law must cede to its federal counterpart.124 
A. The Law of Preemption 
The concept of federal preemption derives its authority from the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.125 Based upon the 
language of this constitutional provision, it is well understood that state law 
                                                                                                                     
 119 Id. (“Before authorizing an alternative state pathway, we should give this federal 
expedited process a chance to work.” (quoting California Governor Jerry Brown in his veto 
message)). As an interesting juxtaposition, while vetoing the Right to Try bill, in 2015 
Governor Brown signed into law a bill recognizing patients’ “Right to Die.” See George 
Skelton, Gov. Brown Shows His Contrarian Side in Bills He Signed and Vetoed,  
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-cap-brown-bills-
20151015-column.html [https://perma.cc/8HLN-2HF8].  
 120 See infra Part VI.C for additional discussion on the FDA’s latest efforts to reform 
its drug approval process.  
 121 Bellamy, supra note 82. Hypothetically, if a drug manufacturer operated 
completely intrastate, it is possible it would be immune from federal jurisdiction and not 
governed by the FDA. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  
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that contravenes federal law is “without effect.”126 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that the phrase “Laws of the United States” encompasses 
both federal statutes as well as “federal regulations that are properly adopted in 
accordance with statutory authorization.”127  
The Supreme Court has recognized two cornerstones of preemption 
jurisprudence. First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.”128 And second, when Congress has 
“‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,’ . . . [courts] ‘start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”129 This presumption against 
preemption has particular force in matters affecting health and safety, which 
have historically been regarded as matters best left to the states for 
regulation.130 However, the Supreme Court has indicated that this presumption 
does not apply to those interests at stake that are “uniquely federal” in 
nature.131 Instead, when the interest affects “[t]he relationship between a 
federal agency and the entity it regulates,” the relationship is “inherently 
federal in character because the relationship originates from, is governed by, 
and terminates according to federal law.”132  
There are two broad categories of preemption, express preemption and 
implied preemption.133 A state law is expressly preempted when a federal 
statute explicitly states Congress’s intent to preempt state law.134 Courts have 
been much more willing to invoke this type of preemption and have construed 
                                                                                                                     
 126 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819).  
 127 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1988) (concluding that “‘a federal 
agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt 
state regulation’ and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not 
inconsistent with federal law” (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 
(1986))). 
 128 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 129 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485); see also Cipollone v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). 
 130 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 131 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (quoting Boyle 
v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)) (finding that “[p]olicing fraud against 
federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the States have traditionally occupied’” (quoting 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))); see also Lofton v. McNeil 
Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that the Court 
has recently cast doubt on the presumption against preemption, specifically within the 
context of implied conflict preemption analysis). 
 132 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347. 
 133 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (“Congress’ intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the 
statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’” (quoting Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))). 
 134 Lefaivre v. KV Pharm. Co., 636 F.3d 935, 939 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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words in federal statutes that prohibit states from imposing “different or 
additional requirements” very liberally and broadly. However, the presence of 
an express preemption clause in a federal statute does not completely end the 
inquiry; the courts must still ascertain “the substance and scope” of Congress’s 
displacement of state law.135  
Implied preemption is further broken down into several subcategories. 
First, in what is known as field preemption, a federal law preempts a 
corresponding state law if the former so “thoroughly occupies a legislative 
field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.’”136 In determining whether the field is fully occupied, 
courts are to look to the pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, the 
federal interest at stake, and the danger of frustration of federal goals.137  
Conflict preemption occurs when “[i]n the absence of an express 
congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts 
with federal law.”138 There are two types of conflict preemption: impossibility 
preemption and obstacle preemption.139 Impossibility preemption “arises when 
‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility.’”140 Finally, obstacle preemption exists “when a state law 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”141 
B. Right to Try Laws Within the Context of Preemption 
Foremost, Right to Try laws do not present an issue of express 
preemption, as the FDCA contains no express preemption clause, unlike the 
MDA, where 21 U.S.C. § 360k states that “no State . . . may establish . . . any 
requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and . . . which relates to the safety 
or effectiveness of the device.”142 To the contrary, the Kefauver Harris 
                                                                                                                     
 135 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
 136 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)); see also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956); 
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
 137 Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504 (“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in 
hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help 
because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.” (quoting Charleston & 
W. Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915))). 
 138 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.  
 139 Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991). 
 140 Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
 141 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 142 MDA § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). When Congress included this express 
preemption provision within the MDA of 1976, it could have easily added a parallel 
provision for prescription drugs, yet declined to do so. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 
312, 316–17 (2008).  
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Amendments to the FDCA added a savings clause to the Act, noting that 
“[n]othing in the amendments made by this Act to the [FDCA] shall be 
construed as invalidating any provision of State law which would be valid in 
the absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict 
between such amendments and such provision of State law.”143 Therefore, it 
must be determined whether Right to Try laws are impliedly preempted, such 
that they create “a direct and positive conflict” with the FDCA.  
In analyzing claims of implied preemption, the inquiry into congressional 
intent and purpose in enacting the FDCA is initially complicated when viewed 
within the context of the presumption against preemption.144 There is a tension 
that, on the one hand, Congress may have chosen not to preempt state law 
because matters of health and safety have traditionally been left to states, yet 
on the other hand, Congress’s legislation in the field is so pervasive, or creates 
a direct conflict, such that there is no room for complementary state laws. 
However, this tension can be dispelled because Right to Try laws 
fundamentally alter the relationship between the FDA and drug manufacturers. 
By purporting to give manufacturers the go-ahead to provide experimental 
drugs without FDA approval, the interest at stake, the regulation of the drug 
approval process, is “uniquely federal,” and thus the presumption against 
preemption should not apply within the Right to Try context.  
Therefore, in seeking to determine whether state Right to Try laws are 
impliedly preempted by FDA authority, it is appropriate to first look to the text 
of the FDCA and any accompanying FDA regulations, from which, taken 
together or individually, it can be gleaned Congress’s ultimate objective.145 21 
U.S.C. § 355(a) is an appropriate starting point. This provision states that “[n]o 
person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any 
new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) 
or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.”146 Subsection (b) 
governs the standard drug approval process, while subsection (j) discusses 
abbreviated new drug applications.147 Right to Try laws seemingly grant drug 
manufacturers the right to deliver new drugs into interstate commerce so long 
as they have passed Phase I trials and remain in the clinical trial process, 
despite the absence of any form of FDA approval.  
                                                                                                                     
 143 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962) 
(emphasis added). 
 144 In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 621 F.3d 
781, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is often a perplexing question whether Congress has 
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police 
power of the States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide.” 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947))). 
 145 Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2015); Holk v. Snapple 
Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 146 FDCA § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
 147 FDCA § 505(b), (j), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j). 
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In addition, 21 U.S.C. § 356 of the FDCA and accompanying FDA 
regulations provide numerous ways for drug manufacturers to provide, and 
individual patients to obtain access to, unapproved drugs through the Agency’s 
expedited drug approval process.148 This comprehensive system provides 
strong indication that Congress did not intend for states to provide an alternate 
route to increased access of unapproved drugs. 
Within the context of field preemption, the Supreme Court discussed at 
length in Wyeth v. Levine Congress’s activity since 1906 in passing a series of 
federal statutes pertaining to drug and medical device regulation, including the 
FDCA in 1938 and MDA in 1976.149 In Wyeth, the question was whether the 
FDA’s drug labeling judgments preempted state law product liability 
claims.150 The Court concluded that Congress had ample opportunity to 
include an express preemption provision in the FDCA within the FDA’s 
seventy-year history, yet chose not to do so.151  
Congressional silence on the issue, despite its awareness of the prevalence 
of tort litigation, coupled with the fact that Congress did include an express 
preemption provision for medical devices in 1976, was powerful indication 
that Congress regarded state law product liability claims as a complementary 
form of drug regulation.152 Because the “FDA has [only] limited resources to 
monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market,” the Agency has “long maintained 
that state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection 
that complements FDA regulation.”153  
While the FDA does not necessarily “occupy the field” of drug regulation, 
Right to Try laws likely do not serve as a form of complementary regulation 
that the Supreme Court had in mind in Wyeth. Historically, the FDA looked to 
states to offer additional forms of drug regulation, such as through common 
law torts of failure to warn and product liability claims;154 Right to Try laws, 
however, remove safeguards governing the accessibility of drugs by 
                                                                                                                     
 148 FDCA § 506, 21 U.S.C. § 356. 
 149 See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–68 (2009) (discussing the 
history of the federal statutes relating to drug and medical device regulation). 
 150 Id. at 558–59. 
 151 Id. at 574. 
 152 Id. at 578–79. 
 153 Id.; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005) (noting that state 
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(8th Cir. 2010))). 
 154 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573–74. In Wyeth, the Court recognized that “Congress enacted 
the FDCA to bolster consumer protection against harmful products” and that state law 
remedies, such as the common law tort of failure to warn, may further Congress’s purpose 
by providing another impetus for manufacturers “to produce safe and effective drugs and to 
give adequate warnings.” Id. at 574. 
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circumventing the FDA altogether. Rather than increasing the level of 
assurance that drugs being used are safe and effective, Right to Try laws allow 
for individuals to receive experimental treatments without the knowledge of 
the FDA, consequentially undermining the Agency’s monitoring mechanism. 
This distinction would likely be important to a court because, despite whether 
there is room for federal and state drug regulation to coexist, the law of federal 
supremacy likely forestalls those state laws that weaken federal enforcement 
mechanisms.  
Moreover, state Right to Try laws will almost certainly not pass muster 
under either type of conflict preemption. As to impossibility preemption, drug 
manufacturers physically cannot remain in compliance with the FDA if they 
provide drugs to patients under Right to Try laws. In PLIVA v. Mensing, the 
Court found it impossible for drug manufacturers to comply with both state 
tort law and federal drug labeling regulations.155 New state law placed 
heightened requirements on drug manufacturers to adequately and safely label 
their products, which the plaintiffs in the case argued imposed stricter 
requirements than the FDA had imposed when the drug labels were approved 
initially.156 The FDA, however, prevented the drug manufacturers from 
independently strengthening their labels to bring them in compliance with state 
law without first obtaining approval through its amendment process.157 Thus, 
the Court concluded: “We find impossibility here. It was not lawful under 
federal law for the Manufacturers to do what state law required of them.”158  
Likewise, it is “not lawful under federal law” for a drug manufacturer to 
provide a drug to a Right to Try patient that has only passed a Phase I clinical 
trial and has not been approved by the FDA for distribution under one of its 
expedited approval or expanded access programs. Therefore, like the Supreme 
Court found in PLIVA, a court would likely “find impossibility” where a drug 
manufacturer was required to comply with the FDA while simultaneously 
proceeding under contradictory Right to Try legislation. 
Additionally, Right to Try legislation frustrates the FDA’s goal of 
ensuring that drugs are safe and effective, as the Agency no longer has the 
capability to monitor those drugs given to terminally ill patients via the state 
laws. Further, drug manufacturers may have increased difficulty finding 
enough individuals to participate in clinical trials, jeopardizing the ability of a 
drug to gain final FDA approval for general public consumption.  
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Court found that state 
law tort claims against drug manufacturers alleging “fraud-on-the-FDA” posed 
a direct conflict “with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently 
with the Administration’s judgment and objectives.”159 Similarly, in the Right 
                                                                                                                     
 155 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011). 
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 159 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001); see also 
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 965–66 (6th Cir. 2004).  
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to Try context, the FDA is tasked with ensuring that drugs are safe and 
effective,160 and by states creating laws allowing individuals to obtain drugs 
directly from manufacturers without FDA oversight, the FDA’s ability to 
fulfill its mission is frustrated.  
V. THE POLICY DEBATE: ARE RIGHT TO TRY LAWS EFFECTIVE? 
Despite the fact that Right to Try laws, if challenged in court, will likely 
be found unconstitutional, the most extensive discussion currently surrounding 
the state laws is whether they are a good idea in terms of policy. There is an 
inherent tension between advocating for faster approval of drugs with the 
hopes of saving lives versus ensuring the drugs are adequately and rigorously 
tested so that they will be safe and effective when approved for general public 
consumption. Advocates of Right to Try legislation criticize the FDA’s 
lengthy and cumbersome policies, especially as they apply to terminally ill 
individuals, and the government’s over-involvement in patients’ lives.161 
Opponents of the laws underscore the concern that the laws are more symbolic 
than effective, could result in uncertainty and false hope, and threaten to 
undermine the drug development process as a whole. 
A. Advocates 
Frustration with the FDA’s current drug approval and compassionate use 
programs unite advocates of Right to Try laws. They decry the current process 
to gain early access as archaic, lengthy, and cumbersome—especially when an 
individual’s life is at stake.162 Led by the libertarian Goldwater Institute, they 
argue that the government is too involved in life-or-death decisions that should 
be between individual patients and physicians.163 According to the Goldwater 
Institute’s President, Darcy Olsen: “Americans deserve transparency. . . . They 
should not have to beg their government for the right to save their own lives, 
or stand by while the government makes decisions behind a veil of secrecy, 
(decisions) that allow some to live and leave others to die.”164 Right to Try 
laws enhance individual autonomy by “cut[ting] through [the] red tape” of 
bureaucracy and allowing doctors, on behalf of their patients, to negotiate 
directly with drug companies, eliminating the federal government from much 
of the process.165  
Moreover, Right to Try supporters underscore that the need for more 
streamlined access to experimental treatments is especially paramount for the 
                                                                                                                     
 160 See generally FDCA § 303, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012) (vesting the FDA’s authority). 
 161 Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. 
 162 Id.  
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 164 Barone, supra note 117 (quoting DARCY OLSEN, RIGHT TO TRY (2015)). 
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terminally ill. Unfortunately, time is limited for these patients and none of the 
FDA processes offer meaningful pathways to access soon enough to make a 
difference in their lives; therefore, proponents of Right to Try laws believe that 
the unique circumstances surrounding patients eligible to receive treatment 
under these laws warrant an exception to bureaucratic treatment.166 “It’s hard 
to argue that a terminally ill person is taking huge risks. . . . The drugs could 
make you die faster or make you miserable, but you’re already headed toward 
a bad outcome.”167  
According to Right to Try advocates, the opinion of a physician coupled 
with minimal safety testing is an adequate scientific basis to allow the 
terminally ill access to investigational drugs.168 And even though Right to Try 
laws may not completely eliminate barriers to access, as patients will still need 
agreement from drug manufacturers to provide the drugs, they are an 
important first step. The laws eliminate 100 hours of FDA-required 
paperwork, allowing physicians to focus their time on negotiating access to the 
drugs for their patients. Finally, the short history of Right to Try laws 
demonstrate our Nation’s system of dual sovereignty operating at its finest: 
deterred in federal court, Right to Try supporters turned to the states as 
laboratories of democracy to garner support for their cause.169 And regardless 
of whether Right to Try laws are ultimately utilized at the state level, they 
have been successful in sparking national discussion and spurring federal 
reform.170  
B. Critics  
Despite the fact that most Right to Try laws passed to date have attracted 
widespread support, due in part to their strong emotional pull, the laws have 
not been without their fair share of critics, including science and policy experts 
who are united in opposition.  
                                                                                                                     
 166 Leonard, supra note 15 (“[L]ack of bureaucracy is needed when it’s literally a 
matter of life and death.”). 
 167 Id. (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of the Division of Medical Ethics in NYU 
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 168 Dresser, supra note 5, at 1631. 
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1. Ineffective at Achieving Their Purpose 
Opponents characterize Right to Try laws as “‘nothing but feel-good 
placebos’ that will have no real impact on drug access.”171 The current 
bottleneck to access, they argue, is not the FDA, who approves ninety-nine 
percent of all compassionate use requests, but rather drug manufacturers who 
are unwilling to provide the drugs out of concerns for cost, liability, and fear 
of jeopardizing ultimate FDA approval. Yet Right to Try laws do nothing to 
incentivize manufacturers to provide the drugs.  
For example, drug companies have expressed concern that by providing 
experimental drugs to Right to Try patients, they may jeopardize their chance 
at FDA authorization because they are circumventing the very Agency they 
seek ultimate approval from to market their drugs to the public.172 This could 
be the case if the experimental treatment exposes previously unknown health 
complications or is ineffective. Additionally, there is concern that drug 
companies could face federal liability should they provide drugs via the state 
laws, as the FDA could challenge the unauthorized distribution as a violation 
of the FDCA.173  
Furthermore, there is the problem of affordability. The production of new 
drugs is expensive and companies typically only produce the precise number 
of doses needed for clinical trials.174 It may be unrealistic to believe that drug 
companies will provide experimental treatments free of charge, and insurance 
companies are not required under the state laws to cover the costs.175 Because 
the laws do not place responsibility for payment on any one party, this creates 
uncertainty, and a likelihood that the patient may end up footing the bill, 
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raising the potential to widen the gap of accessibility between the rich and the 
poor.176  
According to Sascha Haverfield, spokesperson for the pharmaceutical 
industry’s trade group, “[l]egislation at the state level, however well-
intentioned, is unlikely to add any meaningful new approaches that can 
optimize the federal expanded access process overseen by [the] FDA.”177 
Corroborating this statement, there have been very few drug companies to date 
that have indicated a willingness to provide experimental drugs through the 
state legislation.178 Thus, if the drug manufacturers are not on board with 
Right to Try legislation, the effectiveness of the laws will truly be limited. 
2. Undermine Drug Development 
Right to Try laws do not advance science and may in fact inhibit the 
FDA’s ability to monitor the success of experimental treatments, threatening 
the integrity of the drug approval process altogether.179 Under current FDA 
regulations, doctors sponsoring patients proceeding under the compassionate 
use program are required to report any adverse events that result from the 
drug’s administration.180 This oversight mechanism allows the FDA to harness 
its expertise in the drug development process;181 but because the FDA is not 
consulted under Right to Try laws, the Agency will be unable to track the 
success of experimental treatments provided at the state level.182  
In addition, the clinical trial process serves as an essential data-collecting 
tool for the Agency in determining whether drugs are safe and effective.183 
                                                                                                                     
 176 Many Right to Try laws explicitly state that manufacturers may require the patient 
to cover cost of treatment and that insurance companies and governmental agencies are not 
required to provide coverage for the cost of the drugs. See, e.g., id. §§ 2(2), 3(2)–(3). 
 177 Leonard, supra note 15. Haverfield went on to state the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America “have serious concerns with any approach to make 
investigational medicines available that seeks to bypass the oversight of the Food and Drug 
Administration and clinical trial process, which is not in the best interest of patients and 
public health.” Ollove, supra note 1.  
 178 See Sam Adriance, Fighting for the “Right to Try” Unapproved Drugs: Law as 
Persuasion, 124 YALE L.J. F. 148, 155 n.42 (2014). Ironically, the CEO of one of the few 
companies that has shown interest, Neuralstem, chairs the Goldwater Institute’s Right to 
Try Advisory Council. Even Neuralstem, though, who is developing an ALS drug, said it 
would ultimately defer to the FDA. Id. 
 179 Leonard, supra note 15 (“You’d like to turn over every rock to make sure 
[someone] gets a chance to live, but from the standpoint of actually curing people [Right to 
Try laws are] not helpful. The most helpful thing we can do is to get the data . . . You don’t 
learn anything useful from the one-off cases.” (first and third alterations in original) 
(quoting Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, Chair of the Department of Medical Ethics and Health 
Policy at the University of Pennsylvania)); see also Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. 
 180 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.32(c)(1), 312.305(c)(4). 
 181 Barone, supra note 117. 
 182 Leonard, supra note 15. 
 183 Gorski, supra note 31. 
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This process may be weakened if large numbers of people obtain experimental 
treatments through state law because it will become more difficult to find 
participants for clinical trials.184 Ultimately, this could result in an even longer 
premarket drug approval process, further prolonging the time before promising 
new drugs become available to everyone.185  
3. Pose Threat of More Harm than Good 
Finally, opponents of Right to Try laws argue that the laws threaten to 
harm the individuals they purport to help by providing access to unproven, 
potentially dangerous drugs, and offering false hope to patients.186 Moreover, 
there is concern that society as a whole could be negatively affected by the 
state laws. From the perspective of the public health, it is arguably best for 
drug companies to focus on obtaining drug approval from the FDA, rather than 
assisting individual patients through Right to Try laws, so that the drugs can be 
distributed as quickly as possible to the largest number of people who need 
them.187 
VI. A THREEFOLD SOLUTION 
Future action surrounding Right to Try laws entails a series of three steps 
and requires the cooperation of all three branches of government. Foremost, 
the FDA should promulgate a regulation explicitly stating that it has sole 
authority to ensure that safe and effective drugs reach the market and that any 
state law interfering with its authority is invalid. Second, if states do not abide 
by this regulatory pronouncement and continue attempts to pass and enforce 
Right to Try legislation, a party with standing to sue should file a complaint in 
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment of the legality of the state laws. 
After analysis of the language of the FDCA, congressional intent, and the 
Agency’s interpretation, which is entitled to deference, a court will likely find 
that the state statutes encroach upon federal authority. Third, once the state 
laws are struck down, legislatures and the FDA must work together to reform 
the current system to ensure that terminally ill individuals are not 
unnecessarily hindered from gaining access to potentially lifesaving treatment. 
                                                                                                                     
 184 Bellamy, supra note 82. 
 185 Dennis & Cha, supra note 27. 
 186 Gorski, supra note 31 (challenging supporters who claim there is little harm in 
providing little-tested drugs to the terminally ill: “If there’s anything worse than dying 
prematurely of a terminal illness, it’s accelerating your demise, suffering unnecessarily 
during the little time you have left, and/or emptying your bank account while doing either 
or both of these things.”). 
 187 Cha, supra note 174; see also Dresser, supra note 5, at 1645 (noting that 
commentators defending the FDA’s access restrictions believe that “the public, as a body, 
merits protection from interference by individual members of society” (quoting Elizabeth 
Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the 
Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1384 (2009))). 
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The FDA has decades of experience regulating drugs and is well equipped to 
make vital and needed changes to the current system in order to streamline and 
modernize the drug approval process as it applies to those individuals who 
need access the most. 
A. Agency Action: Promulgation of Regulation Explicitly Establishing 
Federal Authority 
Congress has granted authority to the FDA to enforce the FDCA and 
promulgate regulations consistent with the scope of the Act.188 Moreover, the 
1962 amendments to the FDCA made it unlawful for anyone to market drugs 
that the Agency has not approved.189 To date, the FDA has declined to take a 
position on Right to Try laws; however, in a recent statement the Agency did 
express concern about any efforts that might undermine the “congressionally-
mandated authority and agency mission to protect the public from therapies 
that are not safe and effective.”190 The FDA should further expound upon this 
statement and promulgate a regulation or guidance explicitly stating its 
opinion that Right to Try laws infringe upon the Agency’s delegated power, 
are invalid, and should not be followed.191 Should the FDA make such a 
                                                                                                                     
 188 See FDCA §§ 302–304, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332–334 (2012). 
 189 FDCA § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (as amended by Drug Amendments of 1962, 
Pub. L. No. 87-781 § 104(a), 76 Stat. 780, 784). 
 190 Dennis & Cha, supra note 27 (quoting an FDA statement).  
 191 There is a chance that political pressures may prevent the FDA from actively 
opposing Right to Try laws given the laws’ emotional subject matter. If the public 
perceives the federal government as seeking to impede states’ abilities to provide access to 
potentially lifesaving drugs, this will not place the Agency in a tenable position. Instead, 
the FDA could take an approach akin to the one it has taken regarding state marijuana 
legalization laws, choosing not to enforce the federal law and instead hoping that drug 
manufacturers will be unwilling to provide the drugs, rendering the laws ineffective as a 
practical matter. See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let 
Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-
washington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html [https://perma.cc/6N9Y-AWVT]; see also 
Adriance, supra note 178, at 154. 
However, there are notable differences between state marijuana laws and Right to Try 
legislation, which suggest that federal passivity makes little sense regarding the latter. It 
seems unlikely that the FDA would be willing to passively accept Right to Try laws 
because they will hinder the Agency’s ability to collect data and monitor unapproved drugs 
that have been given to patients, and might also cause clinical trial participation to decline, 
delaying ultimate market approval of new drugs. Moreover, without the FDA’s affirmative 
endorsement of Right to Try laws, drug companies will not be incentivized to provide 
experimental drugs. Id. Drug companies will be unable to recoup the costs of 
manufacturing small quantities of a drug to those terminally ill patients who qualify under 
the state laws, and may believe the money is better spent focusing its resources on the drug 
development and FDA approval process. Id. at 155. On the other hand, this is not the case 
with marijuana laws, where suppliers can produce large quantities of the drug to not only 
recoup costs, but also realize significant profits. See id. at 154. 
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pronouncement, it is unlikely that any drug manufacturer would be willing to 
provide drugs under the guise of Right to Try legislation, essentially rendering 
the laws a practical nullity.192 
B. Judicial Declaration: Validity of Right to Try Laws 
Frank Burroughs, founder of the Alliance and avid proponent of Right to 
Try legislation, admits that a lawsuit challenging the legality of these statutes 
is necessary: “[A lawsuit challenging state Right to Try laws] wouldn’t be all 
bad news because it would further elevate this issue in the public arena and put 
pressure on Congress and the FDA to make this change.”193 Once the FDA has 
made its position on the state legislation clear, a party with standing to sue, 
such as a drug manufacturing company, should seek declaratory relief in court 
as to the validity of Right to Try laws.194 
It is likely that such laws will be struck down by a federal court based 
upon the language of the FDCA, indication of congressional intent, and the 
FDA’s own regulations and interpretations.195 While there is no express 
preemption clause included within the FDCA, the Act does grant exclusive 
authority to the FDA to initiate enforcement proceedings against drug 
companies that fail to comply with the FDCA and applicable regulations.196 
Moreover, the 1962 amendments allow for federal preemption when a state 
law is in “direct conflict” with the FDCA.197 Further evidence that Congress 
intended for the FDA to have sole authority to govern this issue can be found 
in the legislative history of the Act.198 Additionally, the executive branch has 
commented that “regulating the safety of drugs . . . is appropriate to the federal 
government, since the products being regulated are usually marketed on a 
nationwide basis.”199 
                                                                                                                     
 192 See Adriance, supra note 178, at 154 n.36. 
 193 Id. at 157 (alteration in original) (quoting Ollove, supra note 1).  
 194 Another option is for a state to seek an advisory opinion from the Commissioner of 
the FDA regarding whether Right to Try laws are preempted. Although the regulation 
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 196 FDCA § 310(a), 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012). 
 197 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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 199 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF, REGAN ADMINISTRATION 
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Finally, whether the Agency issues a new regulation or guidance on an 
existing one, such promulgation will be entitled to deference by courts.200  
Because the FDA is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its 
authority to implement the provisions of the [FDCA], the agency is uniquely 
qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress,” and, therefore, whether it should be pre-empted.201  
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court stated that even where a statute does 
not explicitly recognize preemption, “the congressional grant of authority to 
the agency on the matter contained within [the statute in question]—provide[s] 
a ‘sound basis,’ for giving substantial weight to the agency’s view of the 
statute.”202 
In 2013, for example, the FDA issued draft guidance to clarify the 
regulations surrounding its compassionate use program.203 In this guidance, 
the FDA stated that it “has a long history of facilitating access to 
investigational drugs for treatment use for patients with serious or immediately 
life-threatening diseases or conditions who lack therapeutic alternatives.”204 
This statement would be taken into account and given deference by a court205 
in concluding that the totality of textual, legislative, and regulatory evidence 
surrounding the authority of the FDA implores the conclusion that Right to 
Try legislation must fail.  
C. Legislative Reform: Procedural and Substantive Measures 
While Right to Try laws will almost certainly not withstand judicial 
scrutiny, there is some indication that these laws have already served a 
                                                                                                                     
 200 See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (“[I]n most cases a state law will be 
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 204 See id. at 2. 
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valuable purpose in incentivizing the FDA to consider potential reforms.206 On 
February 4, 2015, the FDA announced a new streamlined process for 
expanded access requests for individual patient INDs.207 These draft 
guidelines include proposed Form 3926, which physicians complete when 
requesting access to an investigational drug outside of a clinical trial for a 
patient “who has a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition 
and there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, 
monitor, or treat the disease or condition.”208 According to the Agency, Form 
3926 “will significantly decrease the amount [of] time it takes to request 
expanded access for individual patients.”209  
This new proposed measure is probably in response to Right to Try 
legislation, as the major criticism of the federal process which state laws 
sought to remedy was the lengthy time it took physicians to request expanded 
access for terminally ill individuals through the compassionate use program.210 
Furthermore, the FDA is also preparing to offer “concierge assistance” to 
physicians completing expanded access paperwork to further alleviate the time 
burden on these sponsors.211 
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There is no doubt that this newly issued guidance is an important first step 
in reforming FDA regulations governing expanded access and signals that the 
FDA is willing to listen. Additionally, as the idea of Right to Try laws have 
percolated to states across the country, legislative reform at the national level 
now seems like a tangible possibility. In July 2015, the Goldwater Institute 
partnered with three federal lawmakers to introduce a national version of Right 
to Try legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives.212 The bill is intended 
to eliminate any potential conflicts between state Right to Try laws and current 
federal regulations regarding the administration of investigational drugs and is 
currently undergoing review by the Committee on Energy and Commerce and 
the Committee on the Judiciary.213 Prior national efforts to reform the FDCA 
and expand access for terminally ill patients never gained momentum,214 but 
supporters hope that the Right to Try movement has stimulated enough 
national discussion to make the bill successful this time around.215  
State and national legislators, as well as the Goldwater Institute, Abigail 
Alliance, and other supporters of increased access should continue to petition 
for federal reform of the compassionate use program. While the newly created 
Form 3926 will cut down on physician paperwork, the next wave of reforms 
should seek to incentivize drug manufacturers to provide the experimental 
treatments. For example, FDASIA, recently passed in 2012, provides for the 
Agency’s ability to collect user fees to aid it in carrying out its mission.216 
Perhaps some of these fees can be used to subsidize the costs of providing 
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experimental drugs to individual patients. Additionally, the FDA needs to 
continue to work closely with individuals to secure access agreements from 
manufacturers. With the FDA’s involvement, drug manufacturers will be 
reassured that providing early access to investigational drugs will not expose 
them to liability down the line or jeopardize ultimate market approval.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Right to Try laws, while well intentioned, are preempted by the FDCA and 
are thus invalid. As the sole regulator of the premarket drug approval process, 
it is imperative that the FDA continues its reform efforts. Right to Try laws 
have served as an important impetus to the Agency in improving its outdated 
methods, including as recently as February 2015, when it promulgated a new, 
more streamlined application process for compassionate use. Legislators, 
regulators, and the public alike should continue to listen to institutions such as 
the Goldwater Institute and Abigail Alliance and determine how unapproved 
yet promising new drugs can best reach the hands of those individuals who 
desperately need them the most. If and when Right to Try laws are declared 
unconstitutional, the attention will shift to the federal stage and the FDA must 
rise to the occasion. It must strive to balance safety with increased access so 
that individuals, on the one hand, will not suffer horrific side effects like those 
experienced by Joe Malinowski, but on the other, will be provided with the 
opportunity, like Austin Leclaire so desperately hoped for, of the right to try. 
